Roswell Information is Slowly Fading Away

For 69 years the government and military have been avoiding telling us the real facts about the 1947 Roswell Incident and what actually transpired back then.

Three things that are inevitable, I suppose, are time, change and progress; and to me, it appears as if all of those are becoming part of the 1947 Roswell Incident. Time, primarily due to the fact that many of the first-hand witnesses some of us have known for years are no longer with us, due to their senior age taking its toll on them to the grave, and I understand that will eventually be all of our demise. For me, I truly miss some of them due to the relationships I had with them the past 20 years doing Roswell research.

By Dennis Balthaser The UFO Chronicles 8-22-16

Change, because it is sometimes necessary, while at other times I have to wonder if the change was really beneficial or needed.

Progress could be a means of developing improvement, or moving forward, however, I don’t always agree with that description either. I’ve seen many changes and improvements over the years which I’m not sure should have been classified as progress.

Add to the above three terms the fact that for 69 years the government and military have been avoiding telling us the real facts about the 1947 Roswell Incident and what actually transpired back then. I can’t help but believe that perhaps that’s the government and military plan, when all the witnesses are gone, changes take place and progress moves on, which will leave nothing to reference back to the 1947 Incident. As a 20 year resident of Roswell I’m starting to see that happen. At times it’s frustrating, but I continue to believe that we need to continue searching for answers, even though the answers are becoming more difficult to obtain because of time, change and progress.

The time factor has been one of the toughest realities I’ve dealt with concerning some of the first hand witnesses I’ve known the past 20 years, who are no longer with us. I had long conversations with many of them during the time I knew them, and am hopeful these witnesses will not be forgotten.

A few I’d like to mention are Jesse Marcel Jr., (Intelligence Officer Major Marcel’s son.) Jesse and I have done lectures together, we’ve had dinner together with our wives, and he and I emailed each other frequently. You miss someone like him when they’re gone, simply because of who he was, and the conversations I had with him over the years.

Two gentlemen that I had the opportunity to be around, almost on a daily basis while I was a volunteer at the UFO Museum in Roswell from 1996 until 1998, were Walter Haut and Mortician Glenn Dennis. They were both original founders of the UFO Museum along with businessman Max Littell.

Walter was the Public Relations Officer at the Roswell Army Air Field, and wrote the now famous July 8, 1947 newspaper article for the Roswell Daily Record under orders of the Base Commander Col. William Blanchard. Walter and I had many discussions about his personal life, and his involvement with the atomic bomb group that dropped the bombs on Japan to end WWII. I was also involved with a video recording Wendy Connors and I did with Walter about his career in the military and his involvement with the UFO Incident.

Mortician Glenn Dennis was the latest first hand witness to pass away in 2015 at the age of 90. I am one of the few researchers who has some slight concerns about Glenn’s account of his relationship with the military nurse at the base hospital, the 6’ 2” Captain that threatened him, and the drawing that nurse did of the alien bodies. That information has never been verified. The nurse and Captain have never been located, and the drawing by the nurse has never been found. I did a FOIA request on Glenn and got a copy of his mortician license issued from San Francisco in 1945, to verify that he was in fact the mortician.

Other people I’ve met over the years no longer with us include Sheriff Wilcox’s 2 daughters; Lt. Robert Shirkey, Weights and Measures Officer at the base in 1947; Art McQuiddy, editor of the other Roswell newspaper in 1947, “The Roswell Morning Dispatch”; among several others. With my interest in the 1947 Roswell Incident since the 1980’s, I feel extremely fortunate that by living in Roswell the past 20 years, I had the opportunity to meet some of these individuals. Consequently I put more confidence in what they told me than I ever will those who have been covering it up for the past 69 years.

St. Mary’s Catholic hospital on the south side of town was replaced in 1997 with a new and needed Chaves County Administration building.

The Roswell Army Airfield hospital in 1947 was torn down before I moved to Roswell in 1996. Today it’s an open field on the base, and there’s nothing to indicate the hospital was ever there other than an old Air Force photograph I located.

I understand the need for changes and replacing buildings, however with an event as important as the Roswell Incident, those old buildings should be remembered with some reference as to what they were, or what took place in and around them. This and future generations will never know what important events took place at those locations.

With the term progress, my biggest disappointment occurred this year when the original Roswell Army Airfield fire station and military base control tower were torn down. It’s now an empty lot. I’ve not heard anything from the city why two buildings of such historical value needed to be discarded. They were some of the original buildings at the base, and are now gone. Luckily I did take a photograph of them before they were torn down.

At 74 years old I also will be gone some day, and I hope that future generations will somehow know the importance of the people and buildings that were involved in the 1947 Roswell UFO Incident, and not let it pass in time, change or progress.

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See Also:

New Revelations On Haut Affidavit

Roswell's Mortician - Glenn Dennis Testimony

Concealing the Truth About Roswell

REPORT YOUR UFO EXPERIENCE

Never-Before-Seen Australian Government UFO Policy -Pt3-

Some of you will be aware that in 1994 the Royal Australian Air Force’s (RAAF) official policy of accepting and investigating UFO sightings, or “Unusual Aerial Sightings” (UAS) as they called them, was massively downgraded to almost nothing at all. I knew there would be a paper trail (beyond what was already released years ago) which hadn’t been appraised before. In September, 2015, using the powerful Freedom of Information (FOI) Act, I submitted a detailed request to the Department of Defence (DoD) for any material that “went into” this policy downgrade. They issued me, at some cost, 42 pages of never-before-seen administrative records from that era. This is the third and final Part of this series. For those who wish to start from the beginning, have a look at Part 1 and Part 2.

By Paul Dean The UFO Chronicles 2-7-16

Beyond what I have highlighted previously, there are some more records that are of some interest. A 3 page “Message Form” dated 24th December, 1993 was sent to six “Air Indicator Groups” (AIG). An AIG is a list of preset destinations for internal message routing. This particular message was titled “Unusual Aerial Sightings: Revised Policy” and had a file reference 138/93/DGPP. DGPP stands for Director General of Plans and Policy. The author was Air Commodore S. T. James who was DGPP for the RAAF in 1993 and 1994. See below:

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Another item which is of note is a reference copy of RAAF Headquarters document which forms a front cover sheet to the dry UAS Policy as it stood in 1984. Indeed, it was 1984 when the RAAF had last changed the policy when they made the decision to cease investigating any and all sighting submitted to them. Only sightings deemed of possible defence or security significance were to be studied. Anything less was simply logged, with a courtesy letter written to the witness. So, what did the 1984 policy look like when crammed into one page? Signed by Air Vice Marshal, J. W. Newman, who held the role of Deputy Chief of the Air Staff from 1984 to 1985, see this outline of the 1984 UAS Policy below:

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I could continue providing textual transcription and imagery of this significant piece of Australian DoD history, but this series needs to be finalized, and anyone who wants to study the records provided to me merely needs to ask. It is absolutely worth other researchers having a look at this material. I have taken much away from these records, and, if nothing else, it proves that the RAAF can locate and prepare 20 year old records with what appeared to me to be relative ease. Also, in regards to the redactions of text found in this release, on the 17th of January, 2016, I appealed the DoD’s FOI decision makers and asked for the blacked-out text to be released in full. I expect an answer by February’s end.

Finally, one very last piece of history that I wish to share is a copy of the RAAF’s 6 page UAS Sightings Annex A, parts 1 and 2. Part 1 was the actual pro forma questionnaire for witnesses to fill out if they so wished; and Part 2 was the Unit Investigation form, which was a RAAF officer’s “investigation” working papers for any given case. These clean, blank forms are how they appeared in the 1980s and early 1990’s. See below.

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See Also:

Never-Before-Seen Australian Government UFO Policy -Pt2-

Never-Before-Seen Australian Government UFO Policy

Impressive UFO Case File From The CIA

NORAD and The UFO Smokescreen (Pt 5)

John Callahan & The JAL-1628 UFO Encounter; FAA Credentials Finally Confirmed -pt2-

REPORT YOUR UFO EXPERIENCE

Never-Before-Seen Australian Government UFO Policy -Pt2-

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In 1994, the Royal Australian Air Force’s (RAAF) policy of accepting and investigating UFO sightings, or “Unusual Aerial Sightings” (UAS) as they called them, was downgraded to virtually no policy at all. But, like all things in modern government, there had to be a paper trail. In September, 2015 I submitted a Freedom of Information (FOI) request to the Department of Defence (DOD) for any material that “went into” this policy downgrade, and I was recently provided with never-before-seen administrative records from that era. I have discussed some of these records in Part 1 of this series, which can be found here.

By Paul Dean The UFO Chronicles 1-29-16

In this Part 2 of the series, I aim to continue providing imagery and discussion regarding this important release of information. In Part 1, the main item I studied was Wing Commander (later Group Captain) Brett Biddington’s (ret) lengthy draft of background information and suggestions which would soon morph into the 1994 downgrade of their UAS policy. One surprise was the level of security classification on much of this material. I also emphasized that some of it remains classified, and has been redacted (blacked out) so it could be released to me.

So what of RAAF Biddington’s final draft for the Chief of Air Staff? At 7 pages long, it differs somewhat from the first draft that Biddington wrote. Firstly, it has a cover page as one may expect, and is somewhat more formal, as we shall see. Firstly, the front cover page has “COVERING SECRET” stamped squarely in place. The title states “BREIF FOR CAS” – “CAS” is the acronym for Chief of Air Staff. Below this is “UNUSUAL AERIAL SIGHTINGS POLICY”. And in the bottom left, is the all-important “Brief prepared by WGCDR B. Biddington.” I have imaged this above.

The next page is has SECRET stamped at the top, as well as “Page 1 of 7” directly underneath. Below that is “DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE” and “(AIR FORCE OFFICE)”. A line of text referring to the existing UAS policy states “Ref: AF 84 3508 Pt l (14)” and is followed by a center-of-page heading “BRIEF FOR CAS” and “UNUSUAL AERIAL SIGHTINGS – POLICY” underneath. The first sub-section is headed here, not surprisingly titled “BACKGROUND,” along with the remaining pages below:

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Now that I have presented the final copy of the massive policy change material that the Chief of Air Staff saw and approved, it is worth having a look at the differences between WGCDR Brett Biddington’s draft and the final product. The draft, which can be examined in my Part 1 of this series, is shorter in regards to page numbers. This is because the line spacing and text is more tightly packed. Also, the final product for the Chief of Air Staff came with a front cover. The level of detail that Biddington goes to in the two products is somewhat different, also. Most importantly for us is the text that discusses RAAF interest in Unusual Aerial Sightings, especially around what I believe to be discussion on re-entered space debris and new (at the time) long-range aerospace surveillance.

For example, in relation to an “extra-terrestrial threat” to Australia, the draft version states on Page 2:

I think that an extra-terrestrial threat to Australian security is not likely to develop without some foreknowledge from astronomical and other surveillance systems. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X The means by which such searches might be conducted are numerous and will vary with particular circumstances.

Compare that to the same topic in the final version, on Page 6:

Should unambiguous extra-terrestrial contact with earth occur (which may or may not be associated with UAS), however remote that possibility might be, levels of organisation well beyond the RAAF will be interested and involved. Should the RAAF be required respond, how we do so will be defined not by extant UAS policy but by instructions from Government. It follows that there is no valid reason for the RAAF to retain a formal interest in UAS.

In the draft version the redacted text is, I believe, most likely discussing long-range radar systems (and possibly other aerospace monitoring technologies) that were being evaluated or in initial stages of operation back in the early 1990’s. In the final version, the “extra-terrestrial threat” isn’t mentioned until Page 6. Also in the final version, there is an extra segment in the “RAAF Interest” sub-section which is worth an extra look and comprises lightly of material in the draft, as well as new discussion:

The enormous improvements in surveillance technologies in the past 20 years make it possible to predict when large items of space junk are likely to fall to earth and where they are likely to fall; this occurred with SKYLAB in 1983. Civil and military aviation communications in Australia are highly developed and initial indications that an aircraft is in difficulty are increasingly likely to come from within the system and not be dependent on external observation of flaming wreckage and falling debris. Witness observations of such events remain important but not from the UAS perspective.

Another difference between the two versions of this policy change material, although small, is the reference to the vanishing of pilot Frederick Valentich and logistical concerns. Paragraph 5, Page 2, of the draft version reads:

At a more mundane level, the UAS mechanism has provided information about missing and crashed aircraft. The disappearance of the pilot Valentich into Bass Straight (flying a Cessna) is a case in point.

Paragraph 8, Page 3, of the final version reads:

At a more mundane level, the UAS mechanism has provided information about missing and crashed aircraft.

I can’t see any meaning to this variance in content. The audience (the Chief of Air Staff), one presumes, expects rapid-fire information with minimum distractions. However, it will be of mild interest to those who have studied the Valentich disappearance. Speaking of the Chief of Air, an additional sentence found in the final version, which may have been tailored especially for him, can be found on Page 2 within the “Community Interest” sub-section:

Neither accusation has caused the RAAF serious embarrassment or concern.

Another difference between draft and final versions, which could be easily missed, is within the mention of probable downed space junk. The draft says:

The most recent example known to me occurred in the late 1970s/early 80s when a RAAF SQDLDR was dispatched at short notice to central Queensland..

The final version says:

The most recent example is thought to have occurred in the late 1970s/early 80s when a RAAF SQDLDR was dispatched at short notice to central Queensland.

See that? The passage of text “…example known to me occurred…” and “example is thought to have occurred” is subtly dissimilar. What meaning this has, keeping in mind the audience who was to review this material, is unknown to me. There are many other variances between WGCDR Brett Biddington’s draft policy review and the final product. Significant work would go into detail every single one. Even then, so little meaning can be attributed to many of them that attempting to do so scarcely seems worth the effort some twenty-two years later. In my next, and final, part of this series, I will discuss some of the other pages in the 42 page PDF that makes up this significant release by our Department of Defence.

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See Also:

Never-Before-Seen Australian Government UFO Policy

Impressive UFO Case File From The CIA

NORAD and The UFO Smokescreen (Pt 5)

John Callahan & The JAL-1628 UFO Encounter; FAA Credentials Finally Confirmed -pt2-

REPORT YOUR UFO EXPERIENCE

Never-Before-Seen Australian Government UFO Policy

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By Paul Dean ufos-documenting-the-evidence.blogspot.com 12-22-15

      After months of too’ing and fro’ing, I have successfully had the Australian Department of Defence (DOD) declassify and release never-before-seen UFO policy material, and a significant fraction of it is very interesting, to say the least.

But, first, I would like to do what researcher Bill Chalker calls “due diligence” and clarify a few things… Way back in 1984, The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) downgraded its investigative responsibilities in regards to UFO sightings. No longer did the RAAF’s Directorate of Air Force Intelligence (DAFI) base-level officers have to investigate all UFO sightings submitted by the general public. This wasn’t a huge blow, as RAAF officers were not compelled or trained to investigate properly anyway. However, continuing RAAF policy stated that any UFO sighting, or “Unusual Aerial Sighting” (UAS), which appeared to show a defence or security threat would still be investigated. A Department of Defence press release on 2nd May, 1984 stated, in part:

The RAAF in future will investigate fully only those Unusual Aerial Sightings (UAS) which suggest a defence or national security implication. The Minister for Defence, Mr Gordon Scholes, said today that while the RAAF would continue to be the first point of contact, UAS reports not considered to have a defence or security implication would not be further investigated.

Fast forward 10 years, to 1994, and the RAAF’s UAS Policy was downgraded further, to virtually nothing. “Enclosure 1 to Air Force file AF 84 3508 Pt 1 – RAAF POLICY: UNUSUAL AERIAL SIGHTINGS” clearly laid out, once and for all, that the RAAF would not accept or investigate any reports of UFOs events. On January 4th, 1994, RAAF Wing Commander (later Group Captain) Brett Biddington stated, on behalf of the Chief of Staff, Air:

For many years the RAAF has been formally responsible for handling Unusual Aerial Sightings (UAS) at the official level. Consideration of the scientific record suggests that, whilst not all UAS have a ready explanation, there is no compelling reason for the RAAF to continue to devote resources to recording, investigating and attempting to explain UAS.

I have always wondered about this “scientific record”? Likewise, I have often been puzzled why more isn’t known about this period of dying RAAF involvement with UAS. In November, 2013 I asked RAAF officer Group Captain Brett Biddington (ret) about this interesting period. The results of that short interview can be seen on Keith Basterfield’s blog site here.

But what about an official paper trail? The DOD doesn’t conclude a policy without some sort of administrative action and tasking. There is always paperwork. On the 23erd September, 2015 I submitted a Freedom of Information (FOI) request for:

copies of any and all material that was created or used to draft this policy conclusion… …including any briefs; draft copies; memoranda; minutes of meetings; references to secondary material used in decision making processes; loose minutes; interagency correspondence; etc.

On the 21st of December, 2015, I received a 42 page PDF from the Defence FOI desk which certainly contains a never-before-seen administrative records from 1993 that helped formulate the RAAF’s shift away from any UFO investigation. The first item of interest is a facsimile transmission, dated 26th August, 1993, from Wg. Cdr. Brett Biddington at the Directorate of Air Force Policy, Intelligence, Russell Offices, Canberra to either Sqd. Ldr. Wright or Mr Barnett, RAAF Intelligence Office, Melbourne. The “SUBJECT” of the transmission is a handwritten note stating “Draft UAS Policy”. Immediately below is a section called “INSTRUCTIONS/MESSAGE”, under which this brief note is made:

Chris, Draft UAS policy + background info as discussed. Hope this helps as an interim measure. I sense no real problem exists in A block – minor changes only are expected, Regards….

Below is an image of this transmission:

Enclosed with this facsimile is Wg. Cdr. Biddington’s first, lengthy drafting of background information and suggestions which would soon morph into the minimalist 1994 UAS Policy. The first surprise is the security classification stamped top and bottom of every page. Traditionally, Australia’s Defence community assigned one of five levels of sensitivity to records: UNCLASSIFIED, CONFIDENTIAL, RESTRICTED, SECRET and TOP SECRET. The material presented here is stamped SECRET which is, despite what people think, actually very rare for Australian UFO records. And, as we shall see, some of this release still remains SECRET, or, rather, has been redacted, even now in 2015! Still, most of Wg. Cdr. Biddington’s efforts have been released. I will present each page, and focus on some quite notable highlights. It should be noted that each paragraph starts off with a letter indicating what security classification was assigned to that particular section. (U) indicates it is UNCLASSIFIED, (C) indicates CONFIDENTIAL, (R) indicates RESTRICTED and (S) indicates SECRET. Page 1 begins with a paragraph of administrative and clerical text, which gives way to a more interesting second paragraph, which was formally classified CONFIDENTIAL (see above top).

The next page of Brett Biddington’s draft material continues in this rather extraordinary manner:

How fascinating. A full four lines of text are redacted. I will look at what the contents of this hidden material may be in due course. Continuing on, paragraphs 5 and 6, which mention the vanishing of pilot Frederick Valentich, raises a curious point about a logistical benefits of official study of UAS.

Continuing on with the “Suggested Policy” section:

Finally, the last page of Brett Biddington’s draft contains the inevitable “Recommendation” section. Oddly, there may be a typing error here, as he numbers it “12” when it should be, judging by the numbering of paragraphs on the previous page, numbered “13”:

Note on the above last page there is also the listing of an annex titled “Current UAS policy, dated Arp 84” which of course refers to what was then the current UAS policy apparently in need of the complete overhaul that Biddington was prescribing. We’ve seen some of the 1984 UAS material, so I will discuss it only briefly, and further along. For now, what of the above material? The security classification level gave me degree of surprise, but I take the common sense angle: In any lengthy DOD publication, some paragraphs will be classified differently than others, and, indeed, the above material ranged from UNCLASSIFIED to SECRET. But, overall, the publication in its entirety has to be classified at the level of the highest classified paragraph. I have seen bulky US Air Force squadron histories classified SECRET merely because a few lines were classified at that level; but in reality the vast majority of the publication does not warrant this level of restriction. In the case of Brett Biddington’s draft UAS material, it is expected that any such Directorate of Air Force Policy, especially coming out of the Intelligence section, or “AFPOL3”, would have some sensitivities.

That is, if we still lived in 1993….

The redactions that we are interested in here were done under Section 47E of the FOI Act. In one section of the DOD’s final letter to me, it was stated that:

…disclosure of the information under section 47E would prejudice Defence’s ability to obtain similar information in the future and would compromise the ability of the RAAF to complete its mandated role, namely defending Australia and its national interests from the air.

Moreover, another paragraph stated, in regards to the person making the final decision about the documents being redacted:

GPCAPT Wallis is satisfied that the expected effect of disclosing to you material identified exempt under section 47E(d) could have a substantial adverse effect on the proper and efficient conduct of the operations of Defence, in that once the information was made publically available it could divulge areas of capability interest.

So what do we think they may say under that black ink?

Take a look at parapgraph 4, which, again, states:

4. (S) In the past, responsibility for UAS has allowed X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X The most recent example known to me occurred in the late 1970s/early 80s when a RAAF SQDLDR was dispatched at short notice to central Queensland X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

This tells me that the RAAF has been able to use civilian UAS reporting to find, or attempt to find, manmade space junk that has re-entered and crash landed – something absolutely inevitable in a nation large as Australia. Various US Air Force collection memoranda and policy justifications have stated that downed space junk, especially of Soviet or otherwise Eastern Bloc origins are of considerable value. A November, 1961 USAF HQ Intelligence memoranda laid out that crashed space junk was considered “items of great technical intelligence interest” and that some of the duties of specialised intelligence teams were to “expeditiously retrieve downed Soviet Bloc equipment”. The text in our Biddington draft document mentions a RAAF officer having to dispatch to central Queensland, and I presume it is regarding one of the numerous instances when spherical cryogenic fuel containers came down there. There is a possibility the redacted text is referring to something more exciting, like an incident we have no idea about, or an especially large or technically noteworthy piece of space hardware.

A look again at another section of the document that has significant redaction:

7. (S) I think that an extra-terrestrial threat to Australian security is not likely to develop without some foreknowledge from astronomical and other surveillance systems. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X The means by which such searches might be conducted are numerous and will vary with particular circumstances.

I believe this may refer to Australia’s ability to engage in long-range surveillance – either simply atmospheric, or out into space. The RAAF’s Jindalee Over-the-Horizon Radar Network (JORN) was, at the time of this policy change, being developed and, interestingly, Brett Biddington was involved in the implementation of the huge JORN program. It is quite possible that the above redacted material relates to detection of unearthly craft, on the very off chance they should come! If not JORN, then maybe the blacked-out text refers to Australia’s use of US space tracking systems? Or novel height finding radars quietly in use by our armed forces?

So far, I have only had this FOI release in front of me for two days. I am continuing to study it, and, at 42 pages, there is much more yet here. In Part 2 of this series I will focus on the final copy of Brett Biddington’s material, and some other oddities in the release. This is a somewhat major piece of history – that is if you are interested in the official handling of the UFO issue by Australia’s government. Finally, I mentioned above that the draft document contained an annex titled “Current UAS policy, dated Arp 84”. To build or downsize a current policy, the official doing the work must have to hand that paperwork, and, though we have seen much of the earlier 1984 material before, I think it worth a quick look:

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See Also:

Impressive UFO Case File From The CIA

NORAD and The UFO Smokescreen (Pt 5)

John Callahan & The JAL-1628 UFO Encounter; FAA Credentials Finally Confirmed -pt2-

REPORT YOUR UFO EXPERIENCE

'Unusual Aerial Sightings' Policy Cancellation? Not So Fast – Department of Defence

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By Paul Dean ufos-documenting-the-evidence.blogspot.com 8-15-15

     Up until two years ago, Australia’s Department of Defence (DOD) maintained one scant policy regarding UFO sightings, or, as they term it, “Unusual Aerial Sightings” (UAS). It was titled Defence Instructions (General) ADMIN 55-1, Unusual Aerial Sightings Policy and, with minor changes in 1996 and 2000, had existed as a Defence Instruction (General) since 1994. I found out, inadvertently through other UFO research, that this policy was cancelled in May, 2013. In January 2015, I initiated a Freedom of Information (FOI) request to the DOD asking for all records that “went in to” cancelling this already near useless “policy”. I published two pieces on this sad and sorry matter in April and May. They can be seen here:

UFO Policy Cancelled By Royal Australian Air Force

UFO Policy Cancelled By Royal Australian Air Force (Pt-2)

But was this really the last hoorah? Aside from the Royal Australian Air Force’s (RAAF) “Contacts of Interest” (COI) – the term given to unknown or unresponsive radar tracks picked up by various radar surveillance units of the 41 Wing – there are seemingly no channels within the DOD, at least not that I have yet found, that accept UFO sightings, study them, respond to witnesses, compile data, formulate reports and the like. It really does seem that the cancellation of Defence Instructions (General) ADMIN 55-1, Unusual Aerial Sightings Policy was the final say. No more policy paperwork. Cancelled. Indefinitely.

Except, one thing. There is still a “policy” after all. In fact there is quite a few.

In the 58 pages of documentation I received when I asked for all records related to the 2013 cancellation, I noted two passages of text which alluded to a possible continuation of the old policy in the form of SOP’s at RAAF bases. In military jargon, SOP stands for “Standard Operating Procedure”. On the 8th of July, 2015, I submitted an FOI request to the DOD asking what became of this proposal. On the 10th of August, at surprisingly no cost, I received a series of documents which were responsive to my request.

The first “file” is title RAAF BASE AMBERLY STANDING INSTRUCTION ADMINISTRATION 05-01 DUTY MEMBER ANNEX E and at two pages contains a front cover, and a second page about the RAAF’s stance, at least at Amberley Air Force Base in Queensland, on reports or enquiries regarding “Unusual Aerial Sightings”. It is part of a larger “Standing Instruction” promulgated by the RAAF at the base. The text is extremely similar to the old, full Defence Instruction of the last two decades, and it states, in full:

ANNEXE TO

AMB SI(ADMIN) 05-01

UNUSUAL AERIAL SIGHTINGS

1. In past the RAAF was responsible for handling a1l queries for Unusual Aerial Sightings (UAS) at an official level until J996 when the function ceased to operate. Scientific records suggested there was no compelling reason for the RAAF to continue to devote resources to recording and investigating of UAS.

Responsibilities.

2. The ADF does not accept reports on UAS. If the DM receives a phone call for a sighting, they are to refer the caller to local police authorities. The ADF does not have an affiliation with any existing civil UFO organisations.

3. Some UAS relate to events that have a defence, security or public safety implication which include man-made debris falling from space or burning aircraft. If members of the community have witnessed an occurrence of this type they are to contact the police or the civilian aviation authorities. Any identified aerial activity which appears to have an obvious
defence implication, will be investigated.

Media Organisations.

4. There are occasions when media organisations will seek information regarding a sighting or policy issues UAS. The DM is to obtain the media contact numbers and inform the ABXO on XXXXXXXXX The ABXO may then have the DM contact Defence Public Relations on XXXXXXXXX and pass on the media contact information or ABXO will advise DM to stand-down on the issue.

(Above, top is an image of the above mentioned page).

The above nonsense is so similar to the previous statements of the last 20 years, it is hard to tell the difference now between any of them. The only sliver of information that interests me is the statement Any identified aerial activity which appears to have an obvious defence implication, will be investigated. I mean, what constitutes an “obvious defence implication” and who makes such calls? Even though they are talking about “identified” aerial activity, I will be still looking into this matter in due course. Also, as a matter of interest, I clarified that “ABXO”, mentioned in the final paragraph, is merely short for Air Base Executive Officer.

Continue Reading . . .

See Also:

UFO Policy Cancelled By Royal Australian Air Force

UFO Policy Cancelled By Royal Australian Air Force (Pt-2)

Plenty More UFO-Related Governmental Material Can Be Found

REPORT YOUR UFO EXPERIENCE

See a UFO, Don't Call the RAAF

By www.news.com.au
8-18-15

Editor's Note: The documents cited in the following article were
uncovered by researcher and regular contributor here, Paul Dean.

    IF you happen upon a weird flying object, possibly not of this world, do not bother calling the air force.

WHERE once the RAAF would investigate reports of unidentified flying objects (UFOs) - which it terms unusual aerial sightings (UAS) - it now refers such reports to specialist UFO watchers.
That is unless it has defence, security or public safety implications, which could include crashing aircraft or space debris falling to earth.

Defence instructions relating to UAS - released under freedom of information and published on the defence website - say its UFO function officially ended in 1996.

"Scientific records suggested there was no compelling reason for the RAAF to continue to devote resources to recording and investigating of UAS," one document says.

But that apparently has not got through to the public, with the RAAF issuing fresh instructions to duty officers at air bases such as Richmond.

"Members of the community who seek to report a UAS to RAAF personnel will be referred to a civil UFO research organisation in the first instance," it says in a document dated July 2015. It provides a list of known UFO organisations.

Continue Reading . . .

See Also:

UFO Policy Cancelled By Royal Australian Air Force

Huge Release Of UFO / UAP Information From The Australian Transport Safety Bureau

UFO Over Australia Identified | VIDEO

Does Australia Need Official UFO Researchers?

So Australian Pilots are Reporting UFO Incidents!

REPORT YOUR UFO EXPERIENCE

UFO Policy Cancelled By Royal Australian Air Force (Pt-2)

- click on image(s) to enlarge -

By Paul Dean ufos-documenting-the-evidence.blogspot.com 5-4-15

     In Part 1 of this piece I discussed the May, 2013 cancellation of the Australian Department of Defence’s (DOD) “Defence Instructions (General) ADMIN 55-1, Unusual Aerial Sightings Policy”. Historically, it will be considered, one day, an important chapter in Australian UFO history. Right now, however, it is somewhat of a non-event. The policy was a buck-passing administrative instruction that merely stated that the DOD, especially the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), doesn’t handle “Unusual Aerial Sightings” (UAS) anymore, and hadn’t done for a very long time. So the 2013 cancellation of such a policy has had little to no impact on the UFO issue in Australia. But how did it all come about at the DOD?

In a FASMECC (First Assistant Secretary, Ministerial and Executive Coordination and Communication) Minute, dated 28th September 2012, a three-stage review of old DOD Defence Instructions (General) policies was highlighted as being underway. The Minute states, in part:

“3. For the second stage of the review, I request that you review the list of DI(G) at Enclosure 1 and, for those DI(G) you sponsor, undertake one of the following activities:

a) advise the Directorate of Administrative Policy (DAP) that the DI(G) is no longer required and should therefore be cancelled; or
b) enter the DI(G) into the formal SoDI process by submitting a request for in-principle agreement to DAP; or
c) advise DAP that you are no longer the correct sponsor of the DI(G) so that arrangements can be made to transfer it to another Group or Service, if appropriate.”

Imaged above, top is the Minute provided to me by Defence.

Thus, it is established that some older Defence policies are either no longer required, or, otherwise unworkable or inconsistent with current DOD activities. A list of such policies was provided to me, and, our policy of interest, “Defence Instructions (General) ADMIN 55-1, Unusual Aerial Sightings Policy” happened to be in “Stage Two” of the general DOD reviews. Furthermore, all old Defence Instructions (General) polices must go through a “risk assessment” which, I believe, takes into consideration legal enforcement of any given policy, security risks, and the like. In a 12th November, 2012, email from a Joanne Terry to Wendy Marman, Assistant Director of Administrative Policy, Defence Freedom of Information and Information Management Branch (FOIIMB), it was stated that a Group Captain Watts, RAAF, had responded to the decision to review the RAAF’s UAS policy, and in Group Captain Watt’s response it stated:

“DI(G) ADMIN 55-1 - We have received the background brief and risk assessment for this because AF want to review it. The background brief states that AF were responsible for the handling of unusual aerial sightings, however the function ceased in 1996. It goes on to say that AF no longer monitors this field but that bases still regularly received calls from members of the public. The policy provides guidance for base personnel about what to do when they receive such calls. The risk assessment came out at LOW. As you would be aware DI(G) are a tier one document and tier one documents are our high risk administrative policy documents, they must contain a compliance paragraph as well. This policy does not need to be a DI(G). My strong recommendation is that you cancel it and replace it with SOPs to the bases. I am unable to accept this as a request for in principle agreement and cannot see any reason contained in the background brief that would give us sufficient reason to recommend its review to FASMECC. We will not take any further action on this DI(G) and will await your advice.”

The actual Defence email is imaged below:

- click on image(s) to enlarge -

Say again? A RAAF officer recommends indeed cancelling the UAS policy and to “replace it with SOPs to the bases?” In military speak, SOP merely stands for Standard Operating Procedure. So, this is saying that the RAAF were seriously considering bringing back some sort of base-level response to public enquiries or reports. An SOP on this matter will merely be a one-page, unclassified standard procedural document which sits there on a local hard drive and any RAAF base officer who receives a UFO enquiry can merely refer to the SOP and fob off the person who is making the effort to call them. I guess it could apply to media outlets who phone bases too, but, currently, the DOD Public Relations area handle those sort of enquiries and probably always will – though not very well. Whatever the situation, I will be submitting an FOI request to Defence on the SOP matter to see if anything did come of it. Anyway, as stated in the above text, Group Captain Watts stated that the “risk assessment” for the UAS policy “came out at LOW”, and that, finally, once and for all, “This policy does not need to be a DI(G).”.

Furthermore, in a 13th of November, 2012, internal Defence email, from Wendy Marman to Squadron Leader Jodie Hatch, RAAF, it was stated, in part:

“Thank you for submitting the IPA documentation for DI(G) ADMIN 55-1. As you can see from the response from Directorate of Administrative Policy (DAP) provided below this does not meet the criteria for a DI(G) under the revised SoDI system. In the light of that advice we recommend a cancellation of DI(G) as part of Stage Two review. Our area is happy to discuss with you the most relevant form of instruction to cover this policy (Perhaps an Air Command SI?).”

So, again, not unlike the mentioning of a base level “SOP” we see at least some sort of consideration in continuing a small degree of further responsibility for the UFO, or “UAS”, matter, however watered down. In this instance, as stated above in the email, an Air Command “SI” is eluded to. For those unfamiliar, an “SI” is a “Standing Instruction” promulgated and maintained by the Defence Department’s larger Command’s and Group’s. Once again, I will be finding out what came of this proposal quick smart. Whatever the final outcome of further and ever-weakening RAAF response to the UFO/UAS (SOP’s or SI’s or something else?), a 14th of November, 2012, email further sent “Defence Instructions (General) ADMIN 55-1, Unusual Aerial Sightings Policy” to the grave:

“No further action necessary on this one from AF. FASMECC will shortly send out a Minute to Group Heads and Service Chiefs advising the final list for cancellation for Stage 2.”

And that is how it 50 years of official RAAF interest, or lack thereof, in the UFO/UAP came to an end. There is of course a fair bit more in the material I was sent, but it is almost all internal DOD emails and minutes which restate the same bureaucratic issues and procedural actions over and over again. One thing that may have been of interest was the final distribution list for the cancellation of “Defence Instructions (General) ADMIN 55-1, Unusual Aerial Sightings Policy”. Below is the actual list of internal Defence agencies, offices and divisions that received news of the policy cancellation. Lucky them. When time permits, I will delve into the operations of a few of them, and see if anything useful can be gleaned.

- click on image(s) to enlarge -

Continue Reading . . .

See Also:

UFO Policy Cancelled By Royal Australian Air Force

UFO Over Australia Identified | VIDEO

Does Australia Need Official UFO Researchers?

So Australian Pilots are Reporting UFO Incidents!

REPORT YOUR UFO EXPERIENCE